Abstract

India-Pakistan relations have always been fraught with ambiguity and the pursuit of positive and negative interactions at the same time. Despite both countries' good intentions and noble sentiments for one another, deep-seated apprehensions and historical experiences continue to shape their perspectives on one another. Three factors have historically been viewed by Indians to be impediments to normalisation between India and Pakistan. First, Pakistan has a position in Kashmir. Second, Pakistan is forming an alliance with the West, and third, Pakistan refused to accept India's dominance in the region. Following the 1971 Indo-Pak conflict, India detonated nuclear weapons in 1974. India saw itself as a regional superpower with authority to intervene in the affairs of South Asian nations. Pakistan has long opposed India's dominance doctrine and believed in sovereign equality. This study is qualitative in character, and an effort has been made to fully comprehend the variables that contribute to India-erratic Pakistan ties.

Key Words

India, Pakistan, Kashmir, Relations, Conflicts, Nuclear, Power

Introduction

Pakistan became an independent country on August 14, 1947, after a lengthy and passionate battle for independence. When the Muslims of the Subcontinent was persuaded that the Hindus wanted to permanently repress the Muslims of the Subcontinent, they began their independence movement. Under the guidance of Choudary Rahmat Ali, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Dr Allama Iqbal, and the Quaid-e-Azam, the Muslims of the Subcontinent began their quest and eventually established Pakistan.

Pakistan and India are bitter enemies. Numerous unsolved problems continue to sabotage the relationship, which has been described as hostile and distrustful. Despite having much in common in terms of shared history and cultural ethos, the two are always at odds. Up to 12.5 million people were uprooted as a result of the partition of erstwhile British India, with estimates of the enormous loss of life, honour, and property. The Muslim migrants were mostly looted and robbed, resulting in unspeakable misery. India took steps to undermine Pakistan's economy very immediately after the split. In 1948, India cut off the supply of canal water to Pakistan with the goal of damaging the country's agriculture industry. India has refused to compensate Pakistan for the rightful part of its financial assets. The tribunal established for this purpose set Pakistan's share of the entire cash balance of 4000 million rupees at the time of independence at Rs.750 million. India paid only 200 million of Pakistan's 750 million shares and withheld the rest on the condition that Kashmir is resolved first ( Yaseen, Jathol & Muzaffar, 2016). India, as the stronger country, broke the principles of accession in cooperation with the Viceroy. In the cases of Junagarh, Manavadar, and the Hyderabad Deccan, India sided with the people rather than the rulers who wished to join Pakistan. In the case of Kashmir, on the other hand, India sided with the ruler's wishes while ignoring the Muslim majority. On September 15, 1947, the states of Junagarh, Manavadar, and Mangrol acceded to Pakistan, and Nawab Mahabat Khanji the Third handed over the instruments of accession to Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. On August 15, 1947, the state of Junagarh joined Pakistan. The Governor General of India at the time, Lord Mount Batten, wrote a telegraph to Quaid-e-Azam, claiming that the accession of the state of Junagarh to Pakistan constituted a breach of the division principles. Indian forces marched into the state in September 1947 and seized Junagarh forcefully. This disparity, along with a blatantly selfish and arrogant attitude, adds gasoline to the flames (Ahmad, 2005, p. 42).

Each princely state was given the option of joining Pakistan or India under the partition plan of June 3, 1947. These nations were to make decisions about their future based on their geographical closeness and people's religious and cultural identities. The state of Jammu and Kashmir was created as a consequence of the Treaty of Amritsar in 1864 when it was ceded to Hindu Dogra Chief Gulab Singh for a sum of 75 00000. At the time of the partition, Hari Singh was the king of Kashmir. Kashmir was geographically connected to Pakistan, and the bulk of the population, around four million people at the time of partition, were Muslims (Ayaz, 2014 ).

 The Maharaja proclaimed Kashmir's accession to India on October 25, 1947. On October 27, 1947, India deployed its soldiers in Kashmir. Pakistan refused to accept the situation, declaring that a union of Kashmir with India would never be acceptable. Mr Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister at the time of Kashmir's accession to India, promised that the Kashmiri people would decide the state's future in a plebiscite. As a result, a conflict broke out in Kashmir. The Raja's soldiers were beaten and scattered, and the independence fighters took over 31,250 square miles of the state (Farooq, n.d).

On December 31, 1947, India petitioned the United Nations to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan applauded the U.N.'s participation in the 




Kashmir issue. The Security Council determined that the most equitable and democratic solution 

to the conflict was to determine the State's admission based on the people's freely expressed decision. Since then, important events and talks regarding Kashmir have taken place, but no prominent and accepted answer has emerged. In 1965 and 1971, India interfered militarily with Pakistan, causing security issues. These violent wars exacerbated the deterioration of ties between the two countries (Kareem, 2000).

With the passage of time, Pakistan became a close friend of the United States, while India built strong ties with the former Soviet Union. As a result, differences of opinion on the international stage played a role in keeping the two neighbours apart and separating them into two global blocs. In the 1990s, there was some unexpected friction between two neighbours. Both countries conducted nuclear tests, reaching the brink of nuclear war at one time. India's attitude against Pakistan has been antagonistic over the past two decades. Pakistan has been designated a "Terrorist State." Meanwhile, India stepped up its repression in Kashmir by putting in more troops and military weapons (Khan & Jamaludin, 2019).

The balance of power in the Subcontinent changed in India's favour during the Bangladesh conflict in 1971. In 1974, India became a member of the nuclear club by exploding an atomic bomb. In May 1998, Pakistan conducted six nuclear tests in response to Indian nuclear tests. India did not want Pakistan to become a nuclear power. India has developed weapons of mass destruction in addition to producing a bomb. Today, India spends a large portion of its budget on defence, which is always four times more than Pakistan's defence expenditure. Pakistan has suggested a number of steps to India in order to eliminate the possibility of a nuclear war on the Subcontinent, but India has rejected all of them (Sattar, 2020). The major impediment to normalising cordial relations between India and Pakistan is the Kashmir problem. India claims Kashmir as an important part of its territory, whereas Pakistan claims it as its jugular vein. 







Human Rights Violations in Kashmir; A Long Tale of Human Genocide

Indian security forces stationed in Jammu and Kashmir have killed thousands of innocent Kashmiris, including women and children, instead of acting on the U.N. decision. The discovery of mass graves in Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir is proof of India's reign of terror. Extrajudicial executions, false encounters, deaths of suspects in police custody, disproportionate use of power by security forces, torture and rape by police, arbitrary arrest and incommunicado imprisonment under special security legislation have been reported by the U.S. State Department. Long pre-trial imprisonment, extended incarceration, lengthy trials, restrictions on press and travel freedoms, and general harassment are the daily routine of the Indian military. (Ahmad. I, Bashir.A & 2004).

Pakistan Joined SEATO and CENTO

In 1954-55, Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO to meet its defence needs and maintain territorial integrity. India slammed it, alleging that the pacts are detrimental to India's national interests. She wasn't ready for Pakistan to become a more powerful military force in the Subcontinent. Foreign military aid to Pakistan, India said, posed a threat to India's security. She argued that Western military aid interfered with the affairs of South Asia. As a result, Indian Prime Minister Nehru altered his mind about Kashmir and declined to organise a plebiscite (Ahmad, 2005, p. 58).




Water Dispute and the Indus Basin Treaty

The water conflict has its roots in Punjab's division. It came to light on April 1, 1948, when India cut off the supply of canal waters to Pakistan's West Punjab, threatening famine and agricultural loss in the region. It was a desperate attempt by Indian authorities to achieve their goal of crippling Pakistan's economy. The land of West Pakistan is excellent, but the temperature is hot and dry. Rainfall is infrequent and unreliable. As a result, irrigation via canals taken from the Indus and its five tributaries is nearly totally reliant on agriculture, Pakistan's mainstay. The three western rivers, the Indus, Jehlum, and Chenab, flow into Pakistan from the state of Jammu and Kashmir, whereas the eastern rivers, the Indus, Jehlum, and Chenab, flow into India. From India, the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej arrived in Pakistan. India's claim that she had the right to restrict the supply of water exacerbated the issue. Pakistan had a water deficit for agricultural and electricity development. Following a lengthy conversation between the two Prime Ministers, the two nations struck an interim agreement on India's terms. The flow of water was restored, but the conflict between the two parties remained strained. The two countries decided to sign a pact thanks to the efforts of Mr Eugene Black, the President of the World Bank at the time. The pact was signed in Karachi in September 1960 by Indian Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru and Pakistani President Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan. The agreement was named the "Indus Basin Water Treaty" (Khan, 2018).




India- Pakistan War 1965

Kashmir's condition had deteriorated. Following its defeat over China in 1962, India received huge military supplies from Western countries. The large-scale weaponry transfer to India shifted the balance of power heavily in India's favour. Pakistan has criticised the regional imbalance produced by India's huge military build-up. In Kashmir, the Indian army continued to violate the cease-fire line. A huge number of Kashmiris entered Indian-controlled Kashmir. The Kashmiri people backed the infiltration wholeheartedly. In reaction, the Indian army breached the cease-fire line in Kashmir and took control of the Kargil Passage. On September 6, 1965, India launched a full-scale war on Pakistan without declaring war in order to halt Pakistan's rapid march in Kashmir. From three sides, India breached the international boundary and invaded Lahore. A violent and full-scale battle broke out, lasting seventeen days and ending with India's defeat. On September 23, 1965, a cease-fire was declared thanks to the efforts of Mr U. Thant, the then-Secretary General of the United 

Nations. At the invitation of Russian Prime Minister Kosygin, President Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Shastri visited Tashkent after the war in January 1966. Ayub Khan and Lal Bahadur Shastri struck an agreement after a week of discussions. Ayub Khan was forced to sign the tainted Tashkent Agreement by Kosygin (Ahmad, 2005).




Hijacking of Indian Plane Ganga

On January 30, 1971, two Kashmiris, Hasham and Ashraf, hijacked the Indian Airways Fokker friendship plane "Ganga" and forced the captain to land at Lahore Airport. The hijackers asked that their coworkers be released from Indian prisons. They had issued an ultimatum, threatening to set fire to the Ganga if their demands were not satisfied (Ahmad, 2005, p. 72). The Indian government refused to give in to the hijackers' demands. The hijackers blew up the airliner on February 3, 1971, after the deadline had passed. India blamed Pakistan for the hijacking of an Indian jet in Lahore and barred Pakistan from flying planes over India. Pakistan sent a note to India's High Commissioner in Islamabad on February 5, 1971, rejecting India's allegation of Pakistani complicity in the hijacking of an Indian aircraft and expressing regret for India's unilateral decision to suspend all Pakistani aircraft, including civilian aircraft, from flying over Indian territory and requesting India to reverse its decision. Later investigations proved that the hijackers were not Kashmiri freedom fighters but Indian operatives and that the entire scenario was manufactured to prevent Pakistan from having a direct aviation link with East Pakistan. The Ganga incident aggravated India-Pakistan ties, which were already tense (Ahmad, 2005).

Role of India in the Separation of East Pakistan

India aided the Bangladeshi struggle in a variety of ways. This included assisting Bangali nationalists in establishing a government-in-exile with headquarters in Calcutta, as well as providing financial and military aid through volunteer organisations and a great propaganda effort in favour of insurgent forces. Permission for the Mukhti Bahini to establish base camps in India; recruiting, organising, and training of the Mukhti Bahini by the Border Security Forces (BSF) and the army; and distribution of equipment and weaponry were among the most important contributions (Rizvi, 1986, p. 179). India has also launched an international diplomatic offensive to rally international public opinion in support of its policies on the East Pakistan crisis. The large migration of Bengali refugees into India in the aftermath of the civil war aided India in garnering worldwide sympathy. This embarrassment for Pakistan's military commanders gave India a perfect chance to internationalise the Bengal conflict (Habib, 2011). In the hope that the Mukhti Bahini's volunteers would dislodge the Pakistan Army, India offered the Mukhti Bahini all possible assistance. Despite engaging in significant guerilla action, the Mukhti Bahini was unable to force the Pakistan Army to submit. The Indian authorities were forced to change their tactics as a result of this. They chose to start their Army's engagement in the insurgency by taking direct charge of the Mukhti Bahini's training (Rizvi, 1986). On April 17, 1971, at the request of India, an exile government led by Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman as President and Tajuddin Ahmad as Prime Minister was created in Meherpur. To resist Pakistan's soldiers, the exile government sought an alliance with India. Later, the exile government relocated to Calcutta in order to seek international support for the ostensibly liberated country. (Habib, 2011).




Siachin Glacier

In 1984, two countries went to war on the subject of Siachin. It connects Pakistan with China on a strategic level. The Khunjrab pass, located north of Siachin, is where the Karakoram highway is belted. The Indian assertion that Siachin Glacier is part of Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir has been disputed by Pakistan. In the past, Pakistan has authorised many British, Japanese, and American expeditions to the glaciers (Ahmad, 2005).

Since April 13, 1984, India and Pakistan have battled sporadically on the Siachin Glacier, the world's highest battlefield. At the height of nearly 6,000 meters, both nations maintain a continued military presence in the region. Operation Meghdoot allowed Indian soldiers to infiltrate and enter the area in 1984. On April 25, 1984, the first armed clash on the glacier occurred. Thousands of troops have died as a result of frostbite, snowstorms, and crevasses on both sides (Sattar, 2020). India occupied strategic locations in the Ori and Kargil sectors and built a bridge across the Shyok River, giving her easy access to Siachin (Ahmad, 2005). At Siachin, India created a fait accompli, which the Pakistan Army tried unsuccessfully to dislodge multiple times. This chronic friction point, if left ignored, has the potential to feed into future crises (Khan, 2018). Furthermore, India's campaign against Pakistan's nuclear program began in 1981 and peaked in 1985, when Rajiv Gandhi travelled to the Soviet Union, the United States, France, and other nations to accuse Pakistan of producing nuclear weapons. The Reagan administration testified before the U.S. Congress in 1984 that the Indian military had approached Prime Minister Indra Gandhi with a plan to attack the Kahuta power facility. Israel had prepared to strike Kahuta, and the Israeli government had sought specific infrastructure from the Indian government in order to carry out the plot (Khan, 1999).




Arms Race between India and Pakistan

Following the war of 1971, India ramped up its efforts to become a regional force by expanding its stockpile of conventional weapons. India became the world's sixth atomic power when it detonated a nuclear weapon in 1974. Pakistan was obliged to expedite its nuclear development as a result of these conditions. India conducted five nuclear tests between the 11th and 15th of May 1998 in order to achieve total control over South Asia. These tests tipped the military scales against Pakistan and put the country's security in jeopardy. Furthermore, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, and other major nations failed to properly criticise India. As a result, Pakistan was forced to respond to the Indian explosions by detonating five nuclear bombs on May 28, 1998, followed by another test two days later. Since then, both countries have been involved in an arms race (Ayaz, 2014).

The Brasstacks Crisis

India chose to undertake the largest joint military exercise in South Asian history in the winter of 1986-7. Brasstacks was the code name for the operation, which was planned by General Krishnaswamy Sundarji, the newly appointed Indian Army Chief. It was a large-scale military drill. It called for a quarter-million troops, nine army divisions, five independent armoured brigades, and 1300 tanks to be concentrated in western Rajasthan, just fifty kilometres from Pakistan's borders, giving the assembled forces the capability to launch a piercing strike into Pakistan, cutting off northern Pakistan from the southern part ( Sattar, 2020). Pakistan was deeply concerned about the exercise. Pakistan opted to increase its own military drills in December 1986 as a precaution and countermeasure. Because a large number of Indian troops shifted from the Indian Punjab to participate in the exercise, Pakistan redeployed one armoured corps with elements closer to the Indian Punjab, causing deep anxiety in New Delhi. The crisis reached a pinnacle in January 1987, when India threatened Pakistan to withdraw its forces within 24 hours. Pakistan, on the other side, requested that India first address the root of Pakistan's retaliation. President Zia-ul-Haq was forced to deploy Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar to Delhi as a result of the ensuing tension. Subtle indications were apparently sent out that Pakistan was capable of inflicting offensive harm in the event of an assault. On January 31, a Pakistani delegation arrived in New Delhi, and on February 4, an agreement was reached. Both nations agreed to restore their forces to their pre-war positions during peacetime (Sattar, 2020).




CTBT and India-Pakistan Nuclear Explosions

With its domestic defence production capabilities, India enjoys an advantage over Pakistan in conventional weaponry. India has the fourth biggest military in the world. During the 1965 and 1971 wars, India did not hesitate to use its offensive capabilities against Pakistan. It detonated its nuclear weapon in 1974, necessitating Pakistan's development of a nuclear deterrent capability (Samad, 2011). The 

fundamental goal of the CTBT was to limit the qualitative advancement of weapons technology by current and potentially nuclear weapons states. India was at the forefront of the treaty's early stages. Pakistan backed the pact from the moment it was presented. This attitude was consistent with its long-standing policy of joining the great majority of countries that favoured the limitation, reduction, and elimination of WMDs. Pakistan supported the treaty's completion but stated that it would not ratify it "unilaterally." India's opposition to the treaty's approval cast a pall on the treaty's chances. The treaty's failure was cemented by India's reluctance to sign it. Even the glimmer of hope that the U.S. could persuade India to change its mind vanished when the U.S. Senate voted against ratification in 1997. Furthermore, if India joins the CTBT, Pakistan must not sign until equivalent measures are put in place to protect our national security interests. Establishing a stable and peaceful government in the Subcontinent is a necessary condition for Pakistan to join India in signing the treaty (Sattar, 2020).

India Nuclear Explosions

The global weapons control and non-proliferation framework have been shattered by Indian nuclear blasts. All international weapons control and non-proliferation treaties have been blown to bits, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). All global attempts toward achieving a nuclear-free world have suffered a severe blow. India sabotaged all efforts to establish a nuclear-free zone in South Asia.

India conducted underground atomic tests on May 11, 1998. After 24 years, India finally conducted these tests. Tests were carried out with an overly optimistic evaluation and with the intention of achieving far-reaching global political objectives. India has hoped to get a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. The Security Council's other members all had verified nuclear power status. In order to achieve the same position, India has reasserted its nuclear power capabilities. These facts are supported by statements from various Indian organisations. 'It is a re-assertion of our sovereign right to decide for ourselves how best to meet our security concerns, and it is a repudiation of the nuclear apartheid that the West had sought to impose on us,' said BJP President Kushabhau Thakre. Maharashtra's Chief Minister, Bal Thakeray, said, "We have proven that we are not eunuchs anymore." Air Commodore (retd) Jasit Singh had backed the choice to use nuclear weapons and praised the BJP government's timing (Khalid, 2013).




Pakistan’s Reaction to Indian Nuclear Explosions 

Provocative statements from Indian leaders in the aftermath of the explosions heightened the tensions. It has been reported in many circles that a solution to the Kashmir problem is now feasible. The BJP was outspoken in its desire for a date and location for the last round of talks to finally resolve Kashmir and other remaining issues. India, and even a small group of extremists in occupied Kashmir, questioned Pakistan's nuclear capacity. Pakistan's decision-making body was confronted with a complex scenario. In the event of an explosion, it would be subject to U.S. sanctions, which would have a significant impact on Pakistan's economy. Pakistan was very likely to face Indian aggression even if it exercised maximum restraint. During this time, popular dissatisfaction with the government grew. People in Pakistan have even questioned Dr Qadeer's claim that he was simply waiting for the government's approval. U.S. surveillance satellites were also hanging above Pakistan, monitoring the atomic bomb's preparations. In this regard, CNN claimed on May 26, 1998, that atomic devices had been buried and concrete had been used to stabilise them. Dr Samar Mubarak was granted the green light by the administration in the third week of May. His supervision extended to the entire Chaghi team. Finally, on May 28, 1998, Pakistan conducted six successful nuclear tests. In Pakistan, the response was incredible. In a televised interview, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif also stated that "today we 

have evened the score with India." Pakistan did neither start nor incite the South Asian security tensions. Pakistan felt forced to retaliate against India's provocative nuclear test because of security concerns. Pakistan was compelled by security considerations to respond to India’s provocative nuclear tests (Khalid, 2013).

The Kargil Crisis 1999

The Kargil heights separate Indian-controlled Kashmir from Pakistan-ruled Kashmir. The Kargil crisis was the first significant military clash between India and Pakistan after both sides declared nuclear power status. This battle began as a result of a military action carried out by the Pakistani army. Since the Shimla Agreement, India has encroached on these peaks. During the cold winter months, Indian soldiers would leave these heights and return in the summer. When Indian soldiers returned to take charge in 1999, they were completely astonished to see that the heights had been captured by the Pakistani army (Khalid, 2013).

The manoeuvre was a carbon copy of India's incursion in Siachin and, on a smaller scale, in the Qamar and Chorbatla areas along the Line of Control. It was a clear breach of the Simla Agreement for India (Khan, 2018, p. 79). Following India's nuclear status in 1998, the likelihood of a large-scale conflict between the two conventional rivals, India and Pakistan, decreased since nuclear weapons might be used as a deterrent. Early in May 1999, Indian soldiers captured a section of the LoC on the Pakistani side. They did so after Pakistani invaders, according to them, crossed the Line of Control in the Kargil region and took solid control of numerous hilltops. The Indians saw it as Pakistan's most severe breach of the LoC, putting their vital route to Ladakh and Siachin in jeopardy. It was the start of the most recent spat between the two countries. Due to a large number of casualties and fierce resistance, India significantly boosted the number of troops in the region. When India moved its nuclear weapons around, there was a real danger to Pakistan. Although neither side explicitly stated its desire to deploy nuclear weapons, there was a significant risk of their being used. Nuclear deterrence was crucial in de-escalating and managing the Kargil conflict (Khalid, 2013).

On July 4, 1999, during the Nawaz-Clinton meeting in Washington, the Kargil conflict was resolved. Pakistan had been convinced by the U.S. to remove her soldiers from across the Line of Control in the Kargil area unilaterally. It had been agreed upon by Pakistan. Although both parties expressed a desire to resume bilateral discussions following the resolution of the Kargil conflict, no significant progress was made on the long-standing problem between the two countries (Khalid, 2013).




The Mumbai Attacks 2008 

Ten terrorists attacked Mumbai on the night of November 26, 2008. They opened fire at five different sites at the same time, killing 140 Indians and 25 foreign visitors. Following the Mumbai attacks, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, located in Pakistan, was quickly singled out for suspicion (LeT). Military action against the LeT or any other comparable outfit has been advocated by powerful voices in India's government circles. India retaliated with a powerful media and international campaign, as well as significant official and public outrage. India enlisted the help of the worldwide media as well as the United States. To de-escalate already fragile ties, Pakistan took significant action against the LeT and other terrorist groups. The Indian administration did not warmly acknowledge Pakistan's anti-terrorist efforts. Thankfully, the 2008 Mumbai situation did not result in a military response. An in-depth analysis may readily showcase Pakistan's efforts. The Pakistani government immediately denounced the assaults and arrested the accused, including the alleged mastermind Zakiur Rahman Lakhvi. However, for technical and legal reasons, such as inaccessibility to eyewitnesses and the primary culprit, Ajmal Qasab, who was captured by Indian police and ultimately killed in 2012, the court trial remained inconclusive. The Indian government attributed the Mumbai attacks to the Pakistan Intelligence Agency. The Mumbai terrorist attacks continue to throw a gloomy pall over bilateral ties, obstructing discussion and 

constructive initiatives. Without question, the Mumbai attacks left a deep scar on the Indian psyche (Khan, 2018).

The Pathankot Incident 2016

The 2016 Pathankot assault was a terrorist attack on the Pathankot Air Force Station on January 2, 2016, by a highly armed gang. Four assailants and two security forces members were killed in the first encounter, with a few others injured. The surgery lasted till January 5. The incident was widely condemned across the world. The terrorists, who were dressed in Indian Army fatigues, were later identified as members of the Pakistan-based Islamist militant organisation Jaish-e-Mohammad (Khan,  2018). India avoided blaming Pakistan but wanted severe action. As a result of the incident, India-Pakistan ties have deteriorated. Both India and Pakistan decided to postpone scheduled diplomatic discussions following the strikes. Pakistani officials responded by arresting many Jaish-e-Mohammad members, albeit not Masood Azhar, who was held in protected custody. The air base was opened to a five-member Pakistani investigative team. The crew stayed for three days to gather evidence and interview eyewitnesses and survivors. The Pakistani investigative team concluded that the incident was a false-flag operation organised by the Indian government in order to defame Pakistan. Several members from the Hindu Sena, a right-wing Hindu nationalist organisation, vandalised the Pakistan International Airlines headquarters in Delhi in response to the assault on January 14. The demonstrators allegedly vandalised a computer and furniture while yelling anti-Pakistani chants (Wikipedia, 2021).




Kulbhushan Jadhav Case

Hussain Mubarak Patel, also known as Kulbhushan Jadhav, is an Indian citizen. He was a commander in the Indian Navy who was involved in subversive operations within Pakistan and was apprehended on March 3 2016, in Balochistan during a counter-intelligence operation. The Indian authorities acknowledged Jadhav as a former navy commander but denied any current ties to him, claiming that he retired early and was kidnapped in Iran.

According to Pakistan, Jadhav reached Chabahar on a forged passport and assumed the name of Hussain Mubarak Patel. According to reports, Jadhav's mission was to destabilise Pakistan by bolstering separatist movements in Balochistan and Karachi. He was employed by RAW. He was involved in financially aiding terrorists, and Jadhav has acknowledged his role in the violence in Karachi. Interrogation also showed that Baloch rebels were receiving naval warfare training in an attempt to strike the ports of Gawadar and Karachi. Jadhav's intention was to undermine the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and sow discord among Baloch nationalist political parties. (Wikipedia, 2021).

A Field General Court Martial in Pakistan condemned Jadhav to death on April 10, 2017. The International Court of Justice dismissed India's petition for Jadhav's release on July 17, 2019, and ordered Pakistan to halt the execution.




Uri Incident September 2016

In September 2016, an attack on the Uri military facility along the Line of Control happened. Nineteen security personnel were slain, as well as four militants. India retaliated by claiming that it had carried out a "surgical strike" on militant camps on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control and vowed to isolate Pakistan on the international stage. Pakistan has denied any Indian military action on its soil. Leaving aside the debate over the surgical attack, the Uri event dashed already shattered expectations for a restart of bilateral talks (Khan, 2013).

Soldiers on both the Indian and Pakistani sides of the Line of Control were kept on high alert while security around the army station in Uri was increased. Following the assault, India cancelled its participation in the 19th SAARC summit, which was set to take place in Islamabad, Pakistan, in November. Pakistan's Foreign Office described India's absence from the scheduled SAARC meeting in Islamabad as "unfortunate" and issued a report:

“As for India's explanation, the world knows that India is the one that has been committing and sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan.” The statement made a reference to Indian national Kulbushan Jadhav, who is being held by Pakistan for espionage, and accused India of breaking international law by interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Bhutan withdrew from the meeting later on (Hussain, 2019).

Pakistani film actors and technicians working in India have been prohibited after the Uri attack till the situation returns to normal. The Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) has also ruled out resuming bilateral cricket relations 

with Pakistan. The Indian Badminton Association has also decided to boycott the Pakistan International Series, which is set to take place in Islamabad.

Sushma Swaraj, the Minister of State for External Affairs, and Vijay Kumar Singh, the former Army Chief, both indicated that India would respond in a "befitting" manner to the attack. India also requested that the U.N. Human Rights Council press Pakistan to stop cross-border incursions and remove non-state terrorist infrastructure. PM Modi publicly replied to the assault on September 24. Modi accused Pakistan of the assault, adding that India would never forget Uri and would stop at nothing to isolate Pakistan in the international community (Hussain, 2019).




Pulwama Attack 2019

A convoy of cars transporting Indian security personnel on the Jammu-Srinagar National Highway was assaulted by a vehicle-borne suicide bomber near Lethapora in the Pulwama district of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir on February 14 2019. Adil Ahmad Dar, a school dropout from occupied Kashmir, rammed an explosives-laden SUV, killing 44 troops (Sattar, 2020).

India claimed responsibility for the assault, but Pakistan denounced it and denied any involvement. India-Pakistan ties were severely harmed as a result of the incident. Following the incident, the customs tax on all Pakistani products entering India was increased to 200 per cent. India's government has requested the FATF to place Pakistan on a no-fly list. Across India, protests were staged. On February 14, violent protests in Jammu resulted in the imposition of a curfew. Protests were staged outside the Pakistan High Commission in London by the Indian community in the U.K. The 13th Association of Anaesthesiologists Congress in Pakistan has been cancelled by an Indian delegation of physicians (Butt, 2019).

Shakirullah, a Pakistani prisoner receiving a life sentence in India's Jaipur Central Jail for violating the Unlawful Activities Act, was stabbed and beaten to death by four other convicts on February 20, 2019. Shakarullah was allegedly murdered in a quarrel among the convicts over television loudness, according to India. Pakistan said he was assassinated in revenge for the Pulwama attack (Wikipedia, 2021).

After the incident, Kashmiri students in other regions of India experienced retaliation, including violence, harassment, and expulsion from their homes. No new Kashmiri students would be admitted to two Indian institutions in Dehradun, according to the announcement.




Retaliation of Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman

Wing Commander Abhinandan is an Indian Air Force fighter pilot who was taken hostage in Pakistan for 60 hours during the 2019 India-Pakistan standoff after an aircraft was shot down in an aerial dogfight. Abhinandan was flying a MIG-21 on February 27, 2019, as part of a mission to intercept a Pakistani aircraft infiltration into Jammu & Kashmir. In the ensuing dogfight, he strayed into Pakistani territory, and his plane was hit by a missile (Sattar, 2020). Abhinandan was safely evacuated and landed near the hamlet of Horran in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Before the Pakistan Army rescued Abhinandan, the locals kidnapped and abused him.

Abhinandan was rescued from a violent crowd by Pakistani forces and interrogated while bound and blindfolded with a bloodied face, according to videos and pictures provided by Pakistani officials. On February 28, 2019, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan stated during a joint session of Pakistan's Parliament that the government had agreed to release an Indian pilot the next day as a "peace gesture." On March 1, 2019, Abhinandan finally crossed the Indian-Pakistan border at Wagah (BBC News, 2019, March 1).




India's Role in Balochistan Insurgency

Balochistan, Pakistan's biggest province, is sparsely inhabited. It takes up 43.6 per cent of Pakistan's total land area. Gold, copper, coal, natural gas, oil, and other mineral resources abound throughout the province. Despite its abundant natural riches, the province remains undeveloped and industrialised. For some years, the province has been in instability, and it has always been a tough province to administer. Targeted killings, bombings, security forces strikes, and kidnappings have all grown commonplace (Iqbal, 2012).

An insurrection of this size cannot be sustained for long without outside help, as history has shown. The Pakistani media has often reported on foreign participation in the conflict in Balochistan. India has long backed separatists in Balochistan, both morally and financially. In 2002, India launched a clandestine operation in Balochistan. Insurgent camps have been built around the province. As a result, the province as a whole was seriously corrupted in just three years.

India does not want Gwader to become a competitor to Chabahar, the Iranian port that the Indians are building as a route to Central Asia. In March 2016, Yadav, an Indian Naval officer, was apprehended by Pakistani law enforcement forces in Balochistan. Yadav went on to say that I contact Baloch rebels on a regular basis and carry out terrorist operations with their help. India's main goal is to destabilise Pakistan and declare it a failed state (Yousaf, Ahmad & Shah, 2017).

Conclusion

Pakistan-India ties have a long way to go before they can be considered secure. There are big issues as well as possibilities that might sway the partnership in any direction. The long-standing concerns about Kashmir and terrorism will continue to be a thorn in both governments' sides, preventing the normalisation of ties in the future. There are also possibilities for both countries to seize in order to strengthen their economic and security connections and, maybe, normalise their relationship in the future. Both governments should focus on the peace process in Afghanistan for long-term peace and stability. Afghanistan should not be used to fight one another but rather for long-term peace and economic growth. Both countries would benefit from drafting a security pact that promotes regional peace and stability while taking into account the diverse national interests of all parties concerned. If this is accomplished, the problem of violent insurgency will become less of a concern.

References

• Ahmad, I., & Bashir, A. (2004). India and Pakistan charting a path to peace. Islamabad, Pakistan: Pan Graphics Publications.
• Ahmad, D. S. S. (2005). Foreign policy of Pakistan: A critical study. Karachi: Arshi Publishers.
• Ayaz, B. (2014). What’s wrong with Pakistan?. Haryana, India: Raja Kamal Electronic Press.
• BBC, (2019, March 1). Who is the Indian Pilot Captured by Pakistan?
• Bhatti, M.N., Waris, M., & Muhammad, S. (2019). India policy to isolate Pakistan at international forum and the way forward. Review of Economics and Development Studies. Vol 5, No.4. 703-711.
• Butt, A. (2019, May 1). Kashmir attack: Tracing the path that led to Pulwama. BBC
• Farooq, M.A. (n.d). History of Pakistan and India. Lahore: Jahangir’s World Times Publications.
• Habib, C. (2011, July 25). Bangladesh Salutes Indra Ghandi. The Hindu.
• Hussain, E. (2019). India–Pakistan Relations: Challenges and Opportunities. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 6(1),82–95.
• Iqbal. A. R.(2012). Internal and external factors in Balochistan conflict. ISSRA Papers 2012, 4. 79-101.
• Javaid, D.U., & Javaid. R. (2016, January-June). India influence in Afghanistan and its implications for Pakistan. JRSP, 53(1), 1- 12.
• Kareem, F. (2000). Kashmir is bleeding. Islamabad: National book foundation.
• Khan, D.S. (1999). Pakistan Studies. Lahore: Famous Book Urdu Bazar.
• Khan, R. A. & Jamaludin. (2019). Media, conflict and foreign policy interaction: Analysis of IndoPak media during violence in Indian held Kashmir. Pakistan Annual Research Journal, Peshawar: Pakistan Study Centre. 55(1). 116-129.
• Khan, R. M. (2018). Conflict resolution and crisis management; Challenges in Pakistan-India relations. Washington, D.C.: Stimson Centre.
• Paul, T.V. (2005). The India Pakistan conflict; An enduring rivalry (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Pattanaik.S.S. (1998, November). Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Option before nuclear Pakistan. Strategic Analysis. IDSA. 22(8). 1-15.
• Rizvi, H.A. (1986). The military and politics in Pakistan: 1947-1986.Lahore: Progressive Publishers.
• Sattar, A. (2020). Foreign Policy of Pakistan (5th ed.). Karachi: Oxford University Press.
• Samad,Y. (2011). The Pakistan –U.S. Conundrum. London: Hurst & Company.
• Wikipedia. (2021). 2016 Pathankot attack,
• Wikipedia. (2021). Kulbushan Jadhav.
• Wikipedia. (2021). Pulwama attack,
• Yousaf, N., Ahmad, M. & Shah. Z. ( 2017, January-June). Pakistan Centric Foreign policy of India. Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan. 54(1), 134-148.
• Yaseen, Z., Jathol, I., & Muzaffar, M. (2016). Pakistan and India Relations: A Political Analysis of Conflicts and Regional Security in South Asia. Global Political Review, 1(1), 1–9.